Human Rights Issues in Türkiye

1. Long Lasting Consequences of July 16, 2016 Coup Attempt

Türkiye Coup Attempt and State of Emergency Analysis

On July 15, 2016, Türkiye experienced a failed coup attempt that left the nation in turmoil. While the exact perpetrators of the coup have never been definitively identified, the Turkish government quickly pointed fingers at the Gülen Movement, a religious and social group led by the exiled cleric Fethullah Gülen, initiating a crackdown that profoundly transformed Türkiye's legal and institutional landscape.

During the two years of state of emergency, from July 2016 to July 2018, the government wielded extraordinary powers, fundamentally reshaping the country’s legal framework through a series of decree-laws. In total, 32 executive decree-laws (known as KHK) were issued, with a broad and disproportionate scope, resulting in over 1,000 amendments to existing national legislation. The decree-laws extended far beyond addressing national security concerns. They introduced sweeping changes to laws governing the Constitutional Court, health services, social security, legal medicine, and the media—many of which had no direct relevance to the coup attempt. The whole process also bypassed the Turkish Grand National Assembly, allowing the executive branch to enact laws without parliamentary oversight. The Constitutional Court refused to review the constitutionality of these decrees, concentrating unprecedented power in the hands of the executive. As a result, checks and balances were severely weakened, and the government obtained de facto authority to reshape Turkish society without judicial scrutiny.

In April 2017, in the midst of the state of emergency, adding another layer of attack on the rule of law, the executive organized a constitutional referendum, officially transforming the country’s system from a parliamentary democracy to a presidential regime. The referendum, held under highly restrictive conditions, gave rise to many critics, including from the Venice Commission, regarding the legitimacy of conducting such a significant political reform during a state of emergency, where freedom of expression, assembly, and the press were severely curtailed. As a result of the referendum, the position of the Prime Minister was erased, giving extensive executive powers in the hands of the President, and further eroding checks and balances in Türkiye. With the implementation of the constitutional changes, the President now holds sweeping authority to issue decrees, appoint judges, dissolve parliament, and call elections without needing parliamentary approval.

Another very serious and worrying outcome of the state of emergency was the “permanentization” of emergency powers and of the legal changes operated during the two years. Indeed, with Law No. 7145, emergency powers became integrated into Türkiye’s permanent legal framework. For instance, this law extended the detention period without formal charges to up to 12 days in cases involving multiple suspects, significantly prolonging detention periods compared to pre-emergency regulations. Furthermore, the law permitted governors to restrict movement, impose curfews, ban public gatherings, and conduct searches without formally declaring a state of emergency.

Various United Nations bodies, including the Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures, expressed alarm over the erosion of fundamental rights in Türkiye over continued use of unnecessary and disproportionate emergency powers after the coup.

One of the most egregious actions taken during the state of emergency was the dismissal of 125,678 public servants, including 4,662 judges and prosecutors, under allegations of affiliation with the Gülen Movement. These dismissals were carried out without judicial review or due process, violating individuals' rights to a fair trial and an effective remedy, over vague and broad criteria — such as “membership, affiliation, or connection with a terrorist organization”.

The international community has called on Türkiye to address the systemic human rights violations resulting from these emergency measures. The United Nations Committee against Torture, for example, has urged the Turkish government to repeal legislative acts that were introduced during the state of emergency and later made permanent. The Committee stressed that the application of exceptional measures should be temporary and proportionate to the threat posed and should not result in impunity for acts of torture or ill-treatment (see CAT/C/TUR/CO/5, para. 28 and 29).

IAHRAG has been actively advocating for the Turkish government to restore the rule of law, including through undertaking a comprehensive review and repeal of all legislation affected by decree-laws. It should immediately end its policy of arbitrary dismissals of public servants based on vague and broad criteria and take steps to reinstate individuals who were wrongfully dismissed or provide appropriate compensation.

The failed coup attempt of July 2016 initiated a long and constant period of deterioration of human rights and rule of law principles that continues to affect on a daily basis the country’s legal and institutional landscape, suffocating civil society and all freedoms. The emergency measures have become normalized and entrenched in ordinary law, eroding fundamental rights and freedoms.

IAHRAG pledges to keep working with all relevant stakeholders, in particular UN human rights mechanisms, to restore rule of law and protect the human rights of all in Türkiye.

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See our report for the 4th UPR cycle of Türkiye.

Extract from the Documentary, "The blue Bus", on the cadets caught in the midst of the Coup-attempt on July 15, 2016

Counter-Terrorism Legal Framework Analysis

In the absence of internationally agreed comprehensive definition of terrorism, it is upon each and every State to define what constitutes the acts of terrorism. This, however, does not mean that international law leaves full discretion on how States can define terrorism or treat terrorists.

First and foremost, there exists a widespread consensus on what terrorist act actually is; namely a deliberate assault on civilians or civilian property with the purpose of intimidating a population or to compel a state or international organization to do or abstain from doing any act. States are, therefore, required to adopt national legislations that are limited to criminalizing conduct which is properly and precisely defined on the basis of these elements, as reflected in Security Council resolution 1566(2004) and the model definition advanced by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, and are strictly guided by the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality.

Second, and as importantly, States are obliged to ensure that their counter-terrorism measures comply with all of their obligations under international law including international human rights law. Particularly, States must ensure that their anti-terrorism laws are sufficiently precise in order to comply with the principle of legal certainty, so as to prevent the possibility that such laws be used to target civil society, human rights defenders or journalists on political or other unjustified grounds.

Turkish Anti-Terror Law

Article 1 of the Turkish Anti-Terror Law(Law No. 3713) defines terrorist conduct to include any act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the “aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic” or “weakening or destroying or seizing authority of the State” by means of “pressure, force and violence, terror intimidation, oppression or threat.” Article 2 gives a definition of “terrorist offender” that includes any member of an organization with a terrorist aim, even if he or she does not commit a crime in furtherance of the terrorist aim. Article 314 of the Turkish Penal code also establishes the offence of “being a member of an armed terrorist organization”.

Article 314 is as followed:

“Armed Organization, Article 314:(1) Any person who establishes or commands an armed organization with the purpose of committing the offences listed in parts four and five of this chapter, shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years. (2) Any person who becomes a member of the organization defined in paragraph one shall be sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of five to ten years. (3) Other provisions relating to the forming of an organization in order to commit offences shall also be applicable to this offence.”

The inclusion of elements like “wakening authority of the State” through, for example, “pressure” in no way can be considered to collide with an act of terrorism. As warned by several UN Special Rapporteurs as well as Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the broad character of the definition of terrorism in Article 1 “could entail that a range of speech and association activities protected under international human rights law is characterized domestically as ‘terrorism’... a characterization [that] would permit the arrest and detention of individuals exercising their internationally protected rights, restrictions which would constitute arbitrary deprivations of liberty under international law.”

Indeed, the problematic nature of the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Law has been acknowledged by the Human Rights Committee since its first review of the implementation of the ICCPR by Türkiye in 2012. In its 2012 Concluding Observations, the Committee expressed its concerns “that several provisions of the 1991 Anti-Terrorism Law (Law 3713) are incompatible with the Covenant rights. The Committee was particularly concerned at (a) the vagueness of the definition of a terrorist act; (b) the far-reaching restrictions imposed on the right to due process; (c) the high number of cases in which human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and even children are charged under the Anti-Terrorism Law for the free expression of their opinions and ideas, in particular in the context of non-violent discussions of the Kurdish issue (arts. 2, 14 and 19).” The Committee subsequently required Türkiye to ensure that its counter-terrorism legislation and practices are in full conformity with the Covenant.

This requirement not only was not met by Türkiye, but that in reality and notably, since the coup attempt of July 2016, Türkiye intensified its abuse of counter-terrorism legal frameworks, this time by also targeting real or alleged Hizmet Movement supporters. For example, according to the official statement, 705,172 investigations were carried out for the alleged link to Hizmet movement since 2016.

The Human Rights Committee in its 2024 Concluding Observations “reiterates its concern about the lack of compatibility of the legal framework on counter-terrorism with the Covenant, including the Anti-terror Law No. 3713, in particular articles 1 and 2 on the broad definition of ‘terrorism’ and of a ‘terrorist offender’”. (para 17)

Principle of legality

The abuse of anti-terror legal framework undermines a large amount of human rights and principles (arbitrary detention, fair trial, freedom of expression, association and assembly), the principle of the legality is at the forefront of rule of law erosion, as the vagueness and overreach of such frameworks often lead to arbitrary interpretations and applications of the law.

The principle of legality in indeed the field of criminal law is one of the most fundamental principles of the rule of law. It requires both criminal liability and punishment to be limited to clear and precise provisions in the law at the time the act or omission took place. The principle of legality and its application on terrorist charges was the subject of recent decision of the Human Rights Committee. The Committee had to comment on the legality of the imprisonment of a teacher, Mukadder Alakus allegedly linked with the Hizmet Movement, who was arrested and sentenced to 7 years and 6 months of imprisonment for using ByLock application, having a Bank Asya account, and for participating in a peaceful rally, as evidences for committing terrorist offence in Türkiye. The Human Rights Committee, reviewing her case, declared that her arrest amounted to arbitrary detention, that her trial could not be considered fair and, more importantly, that Türkiye has violated the principle of legality and non-retroactivity of criminal law since “...the author’s alleged use of the ByLock application and Bank Asya account [cannot be] amounted to sufficiently clear and predictable criminal offenses at the time the acts took place” (para. 10.6).

Also, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in its groundbreaking judgment, Yalçinkaya decision (Yüksel Yalçinkaya v. Türkiye, 15669/20) on September 26, 2023, not only endorsed the finding of the Human Rights Committee but even went further by highlighting the systemic problem of Türkiye affecting many individuals allegedly affiliated with Hizmet Movement.

In its judgment, the Grand Chamber found that the automatic attribution of membership of a terrorist organization solely on the basis of the use of a chat app (ByLock), without proving specific evidence of intent or material contribution to an organization, violated the principles of legality and individual criminal responsibility under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Court further found that the scope of anti-terror legislation had been abused: qualifying membership of a union or association that was lawfully operating during the relevant period, without requiring concrete elements of continuous, diverse, and intensive involvement indicative of criminal behavior, does not provide the necessary minimum protection against arbitrary interference. The Grand Chamber concluded that Article 314/2 of the Turkish Penal Code, as interpreted in the context of the applicant’s membership of associations, did not satisfy the ‘prescribed by law’ requirement of the Convention and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR in the present case. It held that:

“The effect of this unforeseeable and expansive interpretation of how the provisions of Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code and the Prevention of Terrorism Act should apply was to create an almost automatic presumption of guilt based on ByLock use alone, making it nearly impossible for the applicant to exonerate himself from the accusations.”

Finally, under Article 46 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber examined the systemic problem arising from the unpredictable interpretation of anti-terrorism legislation by the judiciary in cases involving sympathizers of the Hizmet Movement. The Court stated that the situation that led to a finding of violations of Articles 7 and 6 of the Convention in the present case was not prompted by an isolated incident or attributable to the particular turn of events but may be regarded as having stemmed from a systemic problem.

In this regard, the Court noted that there were more than 8,000 cases pending before it and this number would increase significantly in the future. The Grand Chamber held that: “In order to avoid it having to establish similar violations in numerous cases in the future, the defects identified in the present judgment need to be addressed by the Turkish authorities on a larger scale – that is, beyond the specific case of the present applicant,” particularly in respect of, but not limited to, the cases currently pending before the domestic courts.

Further Reading

3. Administrative Measures Amounting to Discriminatory and Illegal Punishment

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4. Arbitrary Detentions

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5. Indepence of the Judiciary

Judicial Independence and Fair Trial Concerns in Türkiye

Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. It plays an essential role in the realization of all human rights. International human rights law requires that States create independent and impartial legal systems that guarantee that no one is above the law, no one is outside the protection of the law, and no one is excluded or harmed by the law.

In Türkiye, the administration of justice as well as the independence of the judiciary has been a source of long-standing concerns. This concern reached an unprecedented level after the July 2016 coup attempt by the very concrete steps that the Turkish Government took to ensure forced obedience of the Judiciary. Immediately after the coup, the Council of Judges dismissed 4,726 judges and prosecutors, equivalent to one-third of the judiciary. Among those judges were high-level judges: 140 members of the Court of Cassation, 48 members of the Council of State, and 2 members of the Constitutional Court. Criminal investigations were opened against more than 4,000 judges and prosecutors, among whom 1,311 of them were taken into custody and 2,431 were arrested for their links with the Hizmet Movement (see AL TUR 10/2019, AL TUR 2/2019, OL TUR 5/2017).

The dismissal of one-third of the judiciary and replacing them with those who should be more loyal than objective was not the only way that the government resorted to in transforming the judiciary into a political weapon to silence whoever it desires.

1. Changes in the Composition of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors

A key measure taken by the Executive for subordinating the Judiciary has been the amendment to the Constitution in 2017 in order to change the procedures relating to the election of the members of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors; a body that is mandated to ensure and supervise the independence of the judiciary system, among other issues.

Based on these changes, the new Council of Judges and Prosecutors (CJP) was reduced to 13 members (from 22 members previously). While no member of the Council is actually appointed by judges or prosecutors, the President of the Republic appoints 4 members from ordinary judges and prosecutors, and the National Assembly elects 7 members. The Minister of Justice, appointed by the President of the Republic, and their Undersecretary constitute the 2 remaining members, with the Minister presiding over the Council. Hence, with almost half of the Council appointed by the President of the Republic (6 members), and with the Ministry of Justice presiding, the careers of judges and prosecutors across the country are under the control of the executive power.

Many international and human rights institutions have expressed serious concerns over “serious interference with the independence of the judiciary” resulting from such amendments. The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers stated that these changes lead the Executive to control this body and:

“Thus means getting control over judges and public prosecutors, especially in a country where the dismissal of judges has become frequent and where transfers of judges are a common practice” (OL TUR 15/2020, AL TUR 3/2024).

The European Network of Councils for Judiciary (ENCJ) suspended the observer status of the High Council for Judges and Prosecutors of Türkiye in December 2016, as it no longer complied with ENCJ Statutes, which require it to function as an institution independent of the executive and legislature.

As described by Turkey Human Rights Litigation Support Project, Human Rights Watch, and the International Commission of Jurists in a joint intervention to the European Court of Human Rights in the Osman Kavala case:

“The current judicial system in Türkiye appears to function within a self-perpetuating cycle: the government controls and influences the recruitment of judges, some of whom are appointed to the CJP by the government and allies with political control over the Parliamentary appointments, and the CJP then holds significant control over the rest of the judiciary. These conditions fly in the face of the safeguards required for the existence of an independent judiciary.” (para 14)

The Human Rights Committee, in its latest Concluding Observations on the implementation of the ICCPR by Türkiye, raised concerns:

“The amendments made to the Constitution in April 2017 during the State of Emergency, disproportionately strengthened the powers of the Executive, at the expense of the Parliament and the judiciary, raising justified concerns regarding a lack of accountability and separation of powers in the State party; in particular concerning the enactment of laws bypassing the Parliament and appointments to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors without effective oversight procedures.” (para 7)

2. Undermining the Authority of the Constitutional Court

In the context of constant attacks against the judiciary in Türkiye, the Constitutional Court appeared for a long time as the ultimate safeguard to protect and defend human rights and democratic standards, notably through the procedure of individual complaints, which can be lodged by any citizen claiming to suffer violation of any of his/her fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution and the European Convention of Human Rights and its protocols by State authorities.

The first signs of erosion of the Constitutional Court, however, emerged on August 4, 2016, when the Court dismissed two of its members, Judges Alparslan Altan and Erdal Tercan, for their links with the Hizmet Movement.

Effort to decrease the authority of the Constitutional Court in preserving rights continued further. On 11 January 2018, a new phase of decay started when first instance courts challenged the authority of the Constitutional Court finding that the detention of two journalists, Mehmet Altan and Şahin Alpay for offences related to terrorism and the failed coup attempt of 2016, was in violation of their rights. The 13th and later 26th Heavy Penalty Court, as the first instance courts, refused to implement the decision of the Constitutional Court in releasing these journalists by arguing that fundamental rights guarantees as interpreted by the Constitutional Court do not comply with ordinary domestic law! This was the first time in the history of modern Türkiye, that the direct effect of the Constitutional Court decision was not respected by first instance courts.

In 2023, the crisis over the authority of the Constitutional Court reaches its peak in the case of Şerafettin Can Atalay. Can Atalay is a lawyer who is sentenced to 18 years in prison on April 25, 2022 in the Gezi Park trial, where he was charged with “attempting to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Turkey”. His sentence was upheld by the Court of Cassation on September 28, 2023 and he is currently being held in Silivri Prison. In the 2023 general elections, he was elected as a Parliamentarian for Hatay from the Workers’ Party of Turkey (Türkiye Isci Partisi).

On October 25, 2023, the Constitutional Court ruled that Atalay’s rights to “be elected” and to “personal liberty and security” had been violated and ordered the file to be sent to the Istanbul 13th High Criminal Court, the court of first instance, for necessary action to be taken.

The Istanbul 13th High Criminal Court again decided not to implement the decision of the Constitutional Court rather forwarded its decision to the Court of Cassation for consideration. On November 8, 2023, the Court of Cassation decided not to comply with the Constitutional Court’s decision. It also sent its decision to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to initiate the procedures for Atalay’s dismissal from the parliament.

In addition, and extraordinarily, the Court of Cassation filed a criminal complaint to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office of the Court of Cassation against the 9 members of the Constitutional Court who voted in favor of the violation on the grounds that “they violated the Constitution”.

President Erdoğan, commenting on the judicial crisis, qualified the Constitutional Court’s decision as “erroneous” and lamented that it was not the first mistake of the Court. He expressed his preference for a new Constitution.

Observers believe that these kinds of statements and the current crisis are aimed to form a public opinion for justifying the elimination of at least the individual application to the Constitutional Court.

3. The Absence of Fair Trial in Cases Related to Terrorism

In this context, it is not difficult to observe that “Turkish legal system after the coup... does not provide an environment conducive to upholding the standards of due process”. (Gentian Zyberi, former member of the UN Human Rights Committee, Opinion, Özçelik v. Turkey, here)

Judicial harassments of lawyers in terrorism related cases have shrunk even further the already weakened right to fair trial. Only between 2016 and 2022, more than 1,600 lawyers were reportedly prosecuted and 615 were placed in pretrial detention. A total of 474 lawyers have been sentenced to 2,966 years of imprisonment on the grounds of membership in a “terrorist organization,” while in fact most have been prosecuted for exercising their profession and defending their clients (AL TUR 18/2020, and AL TUR 5/2023).

Today, thousands of regular citizens face heavy sentences for the so-called “membership in the terrorist organization” because of merely using the mobile application of ByLock, having accounts in Bank Asya or working in educational institutions at the time that all these activities were completely normal (for the abuse of anti terror law see Section 4.2.) As a result, a massive number of individual petitions have been filed either at the European Court of Human Rights or Human Rights Committee.

The Human Rights Committee in three decisions recently found serious violations perpetrated by Türkiye including the right to fair trial. (Özçelik et al. v. Türkiye, 2980/2017, Alakuş v. Türkiye, 3736/2020, Açıkkollu v. Türkiye 3730/2020)

Also the European Court of Human Rights in the landmark judgement Yüksel Yalçinkaya v. Türkiye, 15669/20, quoting the Committee’s decision Alakus found eventually that the mere use of ByLock is insufficient to support a conviction for membership in a terrorist organization. It added:

“situation that led to a finding of violations of Articles 7 (non-retroactivity of criminal law) and 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention in the present case was not prompted by an isolated incident or attributable to the particular turn of events, but may be regarded as having stemmed from a systemic problem. This problem has affected –and remains capable of affecting– a great number of persons. This is evidenced by the fact that there are currently over 8,000 applications in the Court’s docket involving similar complaints raised under Articles 7 and/or 6 of the Convention relating to convictions that were based on the use of ByLock as in the present case” (para 114)

The Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers echoed the same judgment in its latest allegation letter (June 21, 2024, AL TUR 3/2024) and stated that:

“In view of the systemic nature of the problem, the Turkish judiciary should order retrials in all cases in which ByLock evidence was relied upon, and should urgently implement safeguards to address the existing disparities in cases relying on digital evidence to ensure equality of arms”

The Human Rights Committee in its 2024 on the implementation of the ICCPR by Türkiye raises serious concerns over the right to access to justice, right to a fair trial and the independence of the judiciary due to:

  • “the lack of independence of the Council for Judges and Prosecutors of Türkiye from the executive and legislative branches” (para 39);
  • “the possibility of establishment of multiple Bar associations in the provinces,... creates a risk of politicization of the legal profession and of silencing Bar Associations that criticise the state of the rule of law and human rights” (para 39);
  • “the very high number of lawyers that have been investigated, detained or remanded” (para 39);
  • dismissal of “thousands of judges and prosecutors… without due process guarantees, for their alleged link with the Gülen movement” (para 41);
  • “lack of due process regarding the dismissal of tens of thousands of State officials, including civil servants, judges, doctors, military personnel, police officers and teachers and academics due to their presumed links with the Gülen movement” (para 45)

The Committee specifically raises its concerns:

“... about reports of systematic denial of the right to a fair trial in terrorism-related cases, including involving government critics, human rights defenders, peaceful protesters, and journalists. In this regard, the Committee is concerned about restrictions to the right of defence in the Criminal Code of Procedure in terrorism-related cases, such as article 153.2 which restricts the examination of the content of the file by the defendants; as well as article 154.2 that restricts detainee’s access to a lawyer for up to 24 hours, increasing the risk of torture or ill-treatment...” (para 43)

Further Reading

6. Non Effectivity of Local Remedies

Exhaustion of Local Remedies and ByLock Cases in Türkiye

When it comes to filing individual applications to international judicial bodies, the applicants should always demonstrate that all available local remedies have already been exhausted. This rule, the exhaustion of local remedies, is part of the customary international law and is based on the idea that the national judicial system should be first given the opportunity to correct its errors.

Yet, it is also well accepted internationally that domestic remedies are not to be exhausted if there are serious reasons for believing that applicants have no real prospect of success. In addition, effective remedies are defined in the jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee as the ones that can end the human rights violations; hence, in absence of such remedies, there shall not be any requirement to exhaust them.

In Turkey, regarding judicial cases concerning terrorism charges, local remedies, in particular the Constitutional Court, cannot be considered effective at least for three reasons:

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights clearly found in September 2023, in the landmark decision Yüksel Yalçinkaya v. Türkiye, 15669/20, that:

“The effect of this unforeseeable and expansive interpretation of how the provisions of Article 314 § 2 of the Criminal Code and the Prevention of Terrorism Act should apply was to create an almost automatic presumption of guilt based on ByLock use alone, making it nearly impossible for the applicant to exonerate himself from the accusations.”

According to the European Court of Human Rights, currently there are over 8,000 applications in the Court’s docket relating to convictions that were based mainly on the use of the mobile application of ByLock.

The existence of over 8,000 applications at the European Court means that the Turkish courts had at least 8,000 chances to hear the appeals made by thousands who were found guilty of being members of a terrorist organization for using the ByLock application. 8,000 times, however, their appeals were rejected with judgments that do not even pay lip service to judicial reasoning.

As stated by the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (AL TUR 3/2024):

“Among the various criteria used to charge individuals under Article 314 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC), ‘establishing or commanding an armed organization’, for alleged membership in the Hizmet/Gülen Movement (GM), use of the app ByLock has emerged as the most damning and often decisive evidence, particularly in the post-coup period.”

In all these cases, the findings of the national intelligence services, MİT, on the use of ByLock by the accused are used as grounds for criminal prosecutions and convictions while neither the accused persons nor judges have full access to the MİT’s information or reports. While this practice violates the right to fair trial (see section 4.4), the fact that such reports are accepted as unchallengeable and conclusive facts at all levels of judiciary clearly demonstrates the lack of effectivity of local remedies.

Considering all these, there is no surprise that it is widely recognized that the Constitutional Court, for individual claims of arbitrary detentions of Hizmet/Gülen Movement sympathizers, cannot provide any effective remedy.

The Human Rights Committee held in Mukkader Alakus v. Türkiye, that:

“In the circumstances of the author’s case, the State party has not shown that an individual complaint to challenge the author’s detention before the Constitutional Court would have been effective, in practice” (CCPR 3736/2020, para. 9.5).

In light of the cumulative impact of the aforementioned facts, we assert that, at a minimum, in criminal cases involving ByLock charges, no Turkish court—whether at the first instance or the Constitutional level—is capable of providing an effective assessment or remedy.

IAHRAG is following closely these developments and informs regularly the international human rights supervisory mechanisms about the effectiveness of local remedies, in particular, in terrorism-related charges.

7. Transnational Repression

Transnational Repression and Abuse of Interpol Red Notice in Türkiye

Transnational, or extraterritorial, repression refers to the policy and acts of States that involve or lead to the violation of human rights of specific targets outside of their territorial jurisdiction. Transactional repression is an effort of government to silence dissent voices even beyond their borders, usually carried out through assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family intimidation.

According to the continuous research carried out by Freedom House, these are six countries that currently operate aggressive campaigns of transnational repression among which Türkiye ranks the second after China. According to the Freedom House, “the Turkish state’s current campaign of transnational repression is remarkable for its intensity, its geographic reach, and the suddenness with which it escalated.”

Since the coup attempt in July 2016, Türkiye has particularly targeted Hizmet Movement sympathizers abroad and succeeded in conducting its repressive operations in at least 31 different host countries all around the world. To achieve this, Türkiye mainly relies on renditions, meaning the cooperation of host countries to hand over individuals without due process, or with a slight fig leaf of legality. Freedom House catalogued 58 of these renditions since 2014.

Türkiye’s high level officials do not deny their involvement and on the contrary praise the work of the MİT. In the case of Orhan İnandı, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself acknowledged that Orhan İnandı had actually been abducted by the MİT, declaring after a cabinet meeting on July 5 that:

“We continue our efforts to eradicate FETÖ, which is responsible for many betrayals against our country, especially the July 15 coup attempt. We uncovered all the intimate structures and archives of the organization in strategic institutions one by one. Orhan Inandı, one of FETÖ's top figures, was captured and brought to Türkiye.”

Türkiye’s systematic practice of State-sponsored extraterritorial abductions and forced returns of Turkish nationals has already been recognized as a matter of grave concern by international human rights mechanisms and special procedures. In July 2019, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance referred to Türkiye’s practice of transnational repression and stated:

“One such development is the increasing use of extraterritorial abductions, as the Working Group observed before the General Assembly in 2018. (…) Türkiye continue to seek the cooperation of other States to arrest, often in undercover operations, (…) alleged supporters of the Hizmet/Gülen movement, respectively, living outside the country. The allegations received by the Working Group indicate that individuals often disappear during these operations or once they arrive in the country of destination” (A/HRC/42/40, para. 56).

This systematic practice of State-sponsored extraterritorial abductions and forced returns of Turkish nationals is also mentioned in the allegation letter sent to Türkiye by several human rights mandate holders:

“To date, at least 100 individuals suspected of involvement with the Gülen/Hizmet movement are reported to have been subjected to arbitrary arrests and detention, enforced disappearance and torture, as part of covert operations reportedly organized or abetted by the Government of Türkiye in coordination with authorities of several States” (AL/TUR/5/2020, May 2020).

In its 2021 annual report, which was devoted to the question of enforced disappearances in the context of transnational transfers, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance particularly reiterated:

“its concern about the continued justification of extraterritorial abductions and forced returns under the pretext of combating terrorism and protecting national security... In this regard, the Working Group urges the Government of Turkey to prevent and terminate enforced disappearances, as stipulated in article 2 of the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance” (A/HRC/48/57, para. 103, August 2021).

The Working Group kept expressing its concerns in its most recent report:

“The Working Group is concerned that, during the reporting cycle, the Government of Türkiye has continued to resort to the use of enforced disappearance in the context of transnational transfers, using such transfers as a pretext for an effective means to combat terrorism” (A/HRC/51/31, para. 78, September 2022).

In its most recent 2024 Concluding Observations on Türkiye, the Committee against Torture expressed:

“concern in response to allegations regarding a systematic practice of State-sponsored extraterritorial abductions and forcible returns of individuals supposedly associated with the Hizmet/Gülen movement in coordination with authorities in Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Lebanon and Pakistan, as well as with authorities in Kosovo, as previously raised by several special procedure mandate holders. Such abductions are alleged to have taken place with the involvement of the National Intelligence Organization (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı) and to entail human rights violations such as enforced disappearance and other forms of torture and ill-treatment” (para. 26).

The Human Rights Committee in its latest report reflected the same concern:

“... about reports of extraterritorial abductions and forcible transfers into the State party of more than a hundred persons suspected of being affiliated to the Gülen movement, as well as political opponents or journalists critical of the government, without any judicial extradition procedure...” (para 25)

In a very detailed allegation letter dated October 2024, seven Mandates of the United Nations Human Rights Council reiterated:

“the concerns expressed in communication TUR 5/2020 that the Government of Türkiye continues to engage in a systemic practice of State sponsored extraterritorial abductions and forced returns of Turkish nationals associated with the Gülen Movement. In some cases, people subjected to this practice were forcibly disappeared. We note further reports that the Government of Türkiye has signed bilateral security co-operation agreements with multiple States that contain broad and vague references to combatting terrorism and transnational crime. It is claimed that the agreements have been drafted to permit the expulsion or abduction of anyone deemed to be a ‘security risk’ from third countries. Furthermore, there are additional reports that a standard practice of handing over Gülen sympathizers is being developed through the cooperation of Turkish and foreign State authorities, including at least 10 countries (TUR 5/2020). Cases are also reported of enforced disappearances involving extended periods of secret or incommunicado detention prior to deportation. During these periods, some of these individuals appear to have been subjected to coercion, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in order to obtain their consent to return to Türkiye and to extract confessions that serve as a basis for criminal proceedings (TUR 5/2020). According to victim testimonies, the most common forms of torture include the deprivation of food and sleep, beatings, waterboarding, electric shocks and threats to family members” (AL TUR 5/2024).

Abuse of Interpol Red Notice

A Red Notice issued by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action. It is assumed to be based on an arrest warrant or court order issued by the judicial authorities in the requesting country. Yet, many States have tried to instrumentalize the procedures of Interpol (notably the Red Notice system), whose main objective is to “ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, in order to repress dissident voices, including refugees.

Türkiye has been identified as one of the leading States trying to abuse the Interpol system. According to information from IAHRAG, Türkiye has attempted to upload the names of 60,000 people to Interpol’s database for Red Notice purposes. To give perspective on that number, as of December 2024, the Interpol website...

In June 2021, Interpol decided to reject 773 Red Notice requests from Türkiye against Hizmet Movement supporters. Interpol officially announced to Euronews that it had rejected an earlier request for a Red Notice for Can Dündar (a journalist whose name had been added in December to the Turkish “gray list”; see section on administrative measures), arguing that these requests did not comply with its founding principles.

This practice led the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to note with concern:

“reports of Turkish citizens, including women, being placed on the Interpol Red Notice list and having their passports canceled while travelling abroad, in order to have them deported back to Türkiye” (CEDAW/C/TUR/CO/8, para. 41).

The Human Rights Committee in its latest Concluding Observations reflected the same concern:

“... about allegations of misuse of Interpol Red Notices against these same people [persons suspected of being affiliated to the Gülen movement] and about the use of politically motivated extradition processes (arts. 6, 9, 12 and 14).” (para 25)

IAHRAG is following closely all the moves taken by Türkiye in pursuing its transnational repression policy against its opponents, particularly its systematic extraterritorial abduction, and records, takes necessary action, and informs regularly the international human rights supervisory mechanisms about such violations.

Further Reading

  • Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 10/2019 concerning Mustafa Ceyhan (Azerbaijan and Turkey), 26 June 2019, A/HRC/WGAD/2019/10
  • ECtHR, Shenturk and others v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 41326/17, Judgment, 10 March 2022
  • Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 84/2020 concerning Osman Karaca (Cambodia and Turkey), 3 March 2021, A/HRC/WGAD/2020/84; as well as Mandates of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia; the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants and human rights; and the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Allegation Letter, 11 December 2020.
  • IAHRAG detailed report on the enforced disappearance of Mr. Orhan Inandi to the Human Rights Committee during its consideration of Kyrgyzstan’s 3rd periodic review.
  • HRC, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Kyrgyzstan, 9 December 2022, CCPR/C/KGZ/CO/3
  • IAHRAG detailed report to the Committee against Torture on Azerbaijan’s collaboration with Türkiye
  • Committee Against Torture, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of Azerbaijan, 5 June 2024, CAT/C/AZE/CO/5
  • Jointly with the Turkey Tribunal, IAHRAG detailed report to the Committee on Enforced Disappearance shedding light on how Cambodia committed as well as aided and facilitated the enforced disappearance of Mr. Osman Karaca.
  • Committee on Enforced Disappearances, CED/C/KHM/CO/1, 25 March 2024.
  • IAHRAG detailed report on the abduction of four Turkish nationals in Kenya affiliated with the Hizmet movement.

8. Enforced Disappearances

Enforced Disappearance in Turkey

Enforced disappearance is the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which places such a person outside the protection of the law. It is a crime against humanity.

Enforced disappearance in Turkey dates back to the military coup in 1980. Since then, Turkey routinely uses enforced disappearances to silence opposition. This may explain why Turkey never signed or acceded to the 2006 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which is the first universally legally binding human rights instrument concerning enforced disappearance.

According to a study by the Human Rights Association (IHD), the remains of at least 4,201 disappeared individuals lie in the 348 mass graves, which have been identified to date. In order to hide its involvement in these murders, the Turkish state opens these cemeteries to construction, turns them into dumping sites or builds highways on them.

After the coup attempt of 2016, Turkey’s reliance on the old policy of enforced disappearance emerged again, this time targeting the alleged or real Hizmet Movement sympathizers. It is, however, difficult to know the exact number of people who were subject to enforced disappearance after the coup as most of their families remain silent due to fear of reprisals. Yet, the sudden increase in the number of cases reported to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance is not only illustrative but horrifying:

Between 2002 and 2015 the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance transmitted only one case of enforced disappearance to the Turkish authorities; since July 2016, the Working Group has transmitted 40 cases and sent 12 communications to the Turkish authorities.

In its follow-up report to recommendations after its visit to Türkiye, the Working Group noted its concerns that:

“An entrenched culture of impunity provided a fertile ground for cases of enforced disappearance to increase. The Working Group is particularly alarmed by allegations of enforced disappearances reported to have been perpetrated under the pretext of combatting terrorism against actual or perceived members of Gulen/Hizmet movement, classified by the Government of Turkey as ‘Gülenist Terror Organization (Fethullahçıl Terror Örgütü, FETÖ)’ or ‘Parallel State Organisation (Paralel Devlet Yapılanması, PDY)’. Distressing reports of abductions by state agents in broad daylight, followed by months of torture and ill-treatment in clandestine detention sites aimed at extracting confessions for future prosecutions should be investigated as a matter of urgency.”

The OMCT (Organisation mondiale contre la Torture / World Organization Against Torture) published on August 30, 2022 a Briefing Note on Enforced Disappearances in Turkey, stating that:

“At least three people were abducted in the first five months of 2022 alone (…) Since the failed coup of 2016, the characteristics of enforced disappearances have changed. Their exact numbers are unknown, as they and their families drop complaints due to fear of reprisals. In the 2020 report of the Ankara Bar Association Human Rights Centre, enforced disappearances are identified as a structural problem based on its preliminary assessment of applications concerning allegations of enforced disappearances. In the applications, it is alleged that the individuals were abducted to the knowledge and with the authorisation of public officials. Abductees, whose whereabouts were later discovered, were denied the right to talk to a lawyer or to be examined by an independent physician and were only allowed to meet their families in rooms with cameras.”

The EU Commission 2021 Turkey report (SWD (2021) 290 final/2.) stated that:

“Alleged cases of abductions and enforced disappearances by security or intelligence services in several provinces continue to be reported since the attempted coup with no adequate investigations carried out. The cases of at least two dozen persons allegedly abducted by state agents for many months have not yet been effectively investigated by the Turkish authorities” (p. 31).

The Human Rights Committee in its 2024 Concluding Observations expresses strong concerns:

“The Committee is concerned by numerous cases of enforced disappearances in South East Türkiye, among other serious human rights violations in the region. The Committee is also concerned by allegations of extraterritorial enforced disappearance and other serious human rights violations by Turkish officials, including in areas of Northern Syria. The Committee expresses its concern regarding the lack of information as well as remedies concerning enforced disappearances in Türkiye in the 1980s and 1990s. The Committee is concerned by the provisions of Law no. 2937 on the State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Agency that grant full immunity from criminal proceedings to its agents, since reports indicate their alleged involvement in incidents of enforced disappearance.” (para 23)

IAHRAG is following closely all the practices of enforced disappearance by Türkiye, and records, takes necessary action, and informs regularly the international human rights supervisory mechanisms about such violations.

Further Reading

9. Torture

Torture and Ill-Treatment in Turkey

Torture seeks to annihilate the victim’s personality and denies the inherent dignity of the human being. The right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment is an absolute right that has to be respected and protected in all circumstances even in the midst of wars. No limitation or suspension of this right can ever be justified.

The use of torture is a crime under international law, and its prohibition is part of customary international law, which means that it is binding on every State, regardless of whether a State has ratified international treaties that expressly prohibit the practice or not. Moreover, the systematic or widespread practice of torture constitutes a crime against humanity.

In the direct aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt, torture and ill-treatment were widespread on real or alleged Hizmet movement volunteers or sympathizers. In this regard, the OHCHR in its report on the impact of the state of emergency on human rights in Turkey found that:

“Thousands of uncensored images of torture of alleged coup suspects in degrading circumstances were circulated widely in Turkish media and social networks after the coup, along with statements inciting violence against opponents of the Government. OHCHR received reports of individuals detained and ill-treated without charge by anti-terrorism police units and security forces in unconventional places of detention such as sports centres and hospitals. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment visited Türkiye in November 2016 and found that torture was widespread following the failed coup, particularly at the time of arrest and subsequent detention.”

Although the widespread use of torture and ill-treatment following the coup and during the state of emergency drew international attention to the issue of torture in Türkiye, the practice has been present in the past and persists to this day. In 2024, the Committee against Torture noted with deep concerns:

“… about allegations that torture and ill-treatment continue to occur in the State party in a generalized manner, notably in detention centres, including allegations of beatings and sexual assault and harassment by law enforcement and intelligence officers and of the use of electric shocks and waterboarding in some cases. The Committee is particularly concerned about increases in allegations of torture and ill-treatment following the attempted coup in 2016, including in order to extract confessions, following earthquakes in the south-east of the country in 2023 and in the context of counter-terrorism operations. The Committee is also concerned that counter-terrorism legislation, including Law No. 3713 on Combating Terrorism, is frequently used in order to limit fundamental legal safeguards, including access to a lawyer and the right to review of the legality of detention, in contravention of international standards.”

The various cases that were reviewed as to the situation of arbitrary detainees reveal that torture is organized, systematic and tolerated within the security as well as the judiciary system. It is organized in the sense that it is not a spontaneous action from police officers but rather a clear practice organized within the security and police forces. It is also systematic with a view of extracting confessions and names. It is tolerated in the sense that the Judiciary disregards claims of torture and fails in investigating and prosecuting the perpetrators.

The Committee against Torture in its latest review of the implementation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by Turkey raised several concerns in its 2024 Concluding Observations, including on:

  • Absence of legal safeguards for those deprived of their liberty in law and in practice,
  • Condition of detention,
  • Regime of aggravated life imprisonment, in particular, the stringent conditions of detention for the approximately 4,000 prisoners serving such sentences, which severely limit social contact and visits, and that such limitations continue to apply even in health-care settings,
  • Insufficient investigation of death in custody,
  • Excessive use of force by law enforcement,
  • Violation of the principle of non-refoulement,
  • Forced renditions and extraditions,
  • Judicial harassment of journalists and human rights defenders working on human rights issues,
  • Insufficient investigation and prosecution of acts of torture and ill-treatment,
  • Lack of independence of judges and lawyers,
  • Reliance on confessions obtained through the use of torture and ill-treatment in practice by courts.

The Human Rights Committee, likewise, echoes the concern expressed by the Committee against Torture in the Concluding Observation of the second periodic report of Türkiye regarding the:

“… generalized manner in which torture and ill-treatment allegedly take place in police custody and prisons and the rise in allegations of torture and ill-treatment in recent years. The Human Rights Committee also expresses its concern about the lack of adequate monitoring of police custody and prisons, of a secure and effective complaint mechanism and of impartial, independent and thorough investigations, prosecutions and sanctions commensurate with the gravity of the offence for the perpetrators, leading to a situation of de facto impunity.”

IAHRAG tirelessly supports the victims of torture by using all the available mechanisms in the UN, including the submission of individual communications on behalf of the victims of torture, and by advocating for stronger international action to hold perpetrators accountable.

Further Reading

10. Freedom of Expression and Association

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